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This article focuses on the complex role that oil has played in many conflicts on the African 
continent. It begins by highlighting oil’s influential role within war at a wider international 
level and provides a brief theoretical base from which to explore oil’s role in the African 
continent. Then, the article provides evidence of petroleum’s impact on violent conflicts in 
three African countries, namely Angola, Sudan and Nigeria, in order to highlight oil’s multi-
faceted role on war in Africa. 
 
 
Introduction: oil’s war facets  
 
Oil and gas supplies are becoming scarcer and more expensive. The hunt for the world’s 
remaining resources is creating new alliances and the danger of fresh conflicts. China is 
moving aggressively to satiate its growing appetite for energy, potentially setting up conflict 
with the United States over the dwindling resources of the Middle East and Africa.1 
 
For many within the academic world, oil has created a fluid, dark foundation on 
which many of the world’s wars, conflicts, and grievances have been based upon. This, 
coupled with a geo-strategic energy concern from the world’s leading powers to safeguard 
and access oil, has led to this resource being at the heart of much of the instability in 
countries and regions across the globe. For oil remains an integral part of any country and 
its ability to function at an international, national and local level. Its importance is 
 
1 Erich Follath, “Natural Resources are Fuelling a New Cold War,” Energy and Natural Resources, (8th August 
2006), Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,429968,00.html, (accessed 15th May 
2010). 
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paramount with “the oil lobby...in itself a sub government, with roots planted deep in the 
soil of the real government.”2          
 Oil can have a huge influence on any country and its foreign policy with a clear 
example being the United States. Beginning immediately after World War Two, the United 
States moved towards the domination of the global production and distribution of oil.3 This 
became closely linked to the containment of the Soviet Union and the prevention of 
communist control of this valuable resource, though Scott ascertains that it became a naked 
American determination to control and dominate these oil reserves and prevent this power 
from passing to anyone else.4 In practice this meant that “[f]rom Iran in 1957 to Indonesia in 
1965 and Ghana in 1966, the CIA was involved in the covert overthrow of governments 
around the world that...had threatened to nationalise their oil industries.”5   
 More recently, the United States has been embroiled in two major wars in the Gulf. 
The author Stephen J. Randall concedes that although,  
[c]learly not all...[of the] developments [in the Middle East] were occasioned by the 
importance of oil resources in the region to the international economic world order, 
but it is difficult to imagine, in the post Cold War environment...that the United 
States would view the region as of the highest strategic interest without the oil 
reserves of the Middle East.6 
 
Randell goes on to stress that oil security became a contextual, if not a primary casual factor 
in the United State’s decision for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.7 Indeed, Stephen Pelletier 
argues that Saddam and America’s war was no different to the conflict that Mohammad 
 
2 Peter D Scott, Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia and Indochina, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2003), p.8. 
3 Peter D Scott, Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia and Indochina, p.xiii. 
4 Peter D Scott, Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia and Indochina, p.xii. 
5 Peter D Scott, Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia and Indochina, p. Xiv. 
6 Stephen J Randall, United States foreign oil policy since World War I: for profit and security, (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005 Second Edition), p.11. 
7 Stephen J Randall, United States foreign oil policy since World War I: for profit and security, p.316. 
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Mosadeq, Prime Minister of Iran faced against the British in the early 1950s.8 “Both men felt 
they had a right to exploit their natural treasure to suit the needs of their country. 
Consequently, both defied the will of those who were managing the oil system at the time, 
and both paid for their boldness.”9       
 Thus oil’s impact on individual countries foreign policy has been, and will continue to 
be highly influential, as an ever diminishing supply of petroleum becomes steadily 
outstripped by demand. As the above evidence shows, for the United States and her 
Western allies, oil has been either a key factor or underlying cause for direct military action 
or covert destabilisation of non-United States or Western backed governments. The 
competition between the West and developing countries such as China and India will place 
further demand and strain on oil producing states, not least on those who are politically, 
economically or socially unstable. Many countries such as these reside within the African 
continent and it is here that this article will now focus on.10     
     
Oil and war on the African Continent 
Tied to oil’s impact on individual countries foreign policy has been petroleum’s 
submerse effects on war and conflict itself. This article will investigate the ways in which oil 
has directly impacted war through an investigation of the African continent, which houses 
numerous oil-rich, war-torn countries, whose future has been severely impacted upon as a 
 
8 Here, the Iranian Senate and Parliament voted to take control of the now disbanded Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (APOC) in 1951. 
9 Stephen Pelletier, America’s Oil Wars, (Westport, CT, London: Praeger, 2004). Another example could be 
President Chavez of Venezuela who faced, and successfully survived, a coup in 2002. “Did the United States 
not try to overthrow him in a coup, one strikingly reminiscent of that which was successfully brought against 
Mosadeq?” Stephen Pelletier, America’s Oil Wars, p.147. 
10 For an insightful analysis of the economic and governance issues within Africa see: Paul Collier, Wars, Guns 
and Votes, Democracy in Dangerous Places, (London: The Bodley Head, 2009).  
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result of this natural resource.         
 “Africa holds a fraction of the world’s proven oil reserves-9 percent compared to the 
Middle East’s nearly 62 percent”11, but her “[o]il production... is expected to double over 
the next 20 years while it stays flat or declines in much of the rest of the world”12  This 
doubling of her oil production will see a continual growth in international involvement. For 
example, “China is already the most powerful outside player in Africa”13 In 2005, China 
imported nearly 701,000 bpd of oil from Africa, which was approximately 30 percent of her 
total oil imports.14 The United States is also heavily involved in the continent, and this looks 
set to continue. The National Intelligence Council estimates that United States imports of oil 
from sub-Saharan Africa will increase to 25 percent in the next ten years.15    
 Consequently, international involvement is, like Africa’s oil production, only set to 
expand.  Still, unlike the increase in oil production and revenue, many of these oil producing 
nations’ continue to suffer from dilapidated infrastructure, a chronic lack of public services 
and general populaces that have remained caught in a circle of conflict, despair and 
destitute poverty. Accordingly, three key African case studies will be examined which 
highlight the various effects that oil can have on war. Firstly, it will portray how oil has 
 
11 Stephanie Hanson, “China, Africa, and Oil,” Council on Foreign Relations, (6th June 2008),  Available at: 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/, (accessed 20th April 2010). See also: Stephanie Hanson, “Vying for West 
Africa’s Oil,” Council on Foreign Relations, (7th May 2007), Available at: 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13281/vying_for_west_africas_oil.html, (accessed 7th November 2009). 
12 James Traub, “China’s African Adventure,” The New York Times, (19th November 2006), Available at:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/19/magazine/19china.html, (accessed 7th November 2009). 
13 Richard Dowden, “Why Africa welcomes the ‘new colonialism,” The Times, (Monday 9th November 2009), 
Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6908835.ece, 
(accessed 19th April 2010). See also: Cindy Hurst, “Feigned Ignorance is Bliss: Chinese Energy Investments in 
Africa,” US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Centre (COIN), The Colloquium: Volume 3/2, 
(September 2008 edition, 23rd September 2008), p.2, Available at: 
http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/colloquium/archive/2008/09/23/feigned-ignorance-is-bliss-chinese-energy-
investments-in-africa.aspx, (accessed 10th November 2009),  
14 Cindy Hurst, “China’s Oil Rush in Africa,” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS: Energy Security 
July 2006), p.4, Available at: http://www.iags.org/chinainafrica.pdf, (accessed 9th November 2009).  
15 Alex Vines, “Thirst for African Oil,” Global Policy Forum, (2010), p.20, Available at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Thirst_for_African_Oil.pdf, (accessed 19th May 2010). 
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prolonged the Angolan civil war through one side’s control and subsequent revenue of this 
resource. Secondly, Nigeria will explore how oil has precipitated a low-intensity clash 
between local people’s claims to its revenue on the one hand and the national government 
and multi-national oil corporations on the other. Third and finally, it will analyse the 
situation in Sudan and will describe how her oil sites have been either a root cause or 
background factor for the long-running civil strife and genocide that has plagued the 
country. However, before an analysis of these case studies begins, it is beneficial to have a 
brief understanding of the theory, which can aid in the explanation of this complex situation 
in reality.           
 Philippe Le Billion puts forward his theoretical ideas within the book Angola’s war 
economy: the role of oil and diamonds. He observes that there are two key types of resource 
war.  The first is a scarce resource war where people will fight each other for the resources 
necessary to survive. “To put it a more sophisticated way, resource poor societies are 
confronted by the capture of resource rents by the elite and are unable to adapt to the 
scarcity of resources.”16 An example includes the appropriation of irrigated lands on the 
Senegal and Mauritania border. Violent confrontations between Mauritanian herders and 
Senegalese farmers have erupted along the Senegal River Valley over the increasing 
competition for land. The construction of dams built upstream and downstream has also 
“exacerbated problems in regional land tenure that has often led to tragic consequences for 
the area’s residents.”17        
 Philippe Le Billion’s second type of resource war is the abundant resource war. “Here 
 
16 Philippe Le Billion, ‘The political economy of resource wars,’ in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, eds., 
Angola’s war economy: the role of oil and diamonds, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p.22. 
17 Aziz Salmone Fall, “Conflict in the Senegal River Valley,” Cultural Survival Quarterly, 22.4, (Winter 1998, 
Uprooted: Dispossession in Africa), Available at:  http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-
survival-quarterly/224-winter-1998-uprooted-dispossession-africa?page=3, (accessed 15th May 2010).  
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again a more sophisticated approach argues that a wealth of resources can result in less 
democracy, poor economic growth, and greedy behaviour by competing elites.”18 He goes 
on to stress that dominant resources and its control by the state leaders will lead to little 
hope for those outside state patronage to improve the quality of their lives or gain a decent 
standard of living. In fact, “[t]he more narrowly are the rights held, the less equal will the 
society be.”19 This will create growing frustration amongst marginalised groups and the 
general populace, who could conclude that violence is the only option open to them to in 
order to change their situation. Brutality for the governing body also becomes a method of 
maintaining control which will “create and sustain profitable patterns of resource 
exploitation and wealth distribution.”20 Subsequently, he concludes that these resource 
wars “are conflicts in which violence, or the threat of it, becomes an intrinsic part of the 
political economy of resource exploitation.”21 The three African wars, discussed below, 
clearly highlight this second resource theory in practice.22    
 
 
 
 
       
 
18  Philippe Le Billion, “The political economy of resource wars,”  p.23. 
19 Paul Collier, Anthony J. Venables, “Managing the Exploitation of Natural Assets: lessons for low income 
countries,” (Revised 30th October 2008), p.4,  Available at: 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/africa.htm, (accessed 26th May 2010). 
20 Philippe Le Billion, “The political economy of resource wars,” p.26. 
21 Philippe Le Billion, “The political economy of resource wars,” p.26. 
22 For more in depth analysis of resource wars see: Michael T. Klare, “Resource Wars: The New Landscape of 
Global Conflict,” (London: Penguin, 2005) and Paul Roberts, “The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New 
World,” (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004). 
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Angola 
“Government forces, once backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, are now funded by oil 
revenues.”23 
 
“For all its oil and diamond deposits, Angola is situated at the bottom of every 
development index.”24 The World Bank highlights that approximately 70 percent of the 
population live on less than 2 U.S. dollars a day,25 while one in four children die before their 
fifth birthday.26 This is despite the “darling of the oil industry,” earn[ing] more than $30 
billion [in 2007] from oil exports”27 Without a doubt, oil has been a key growth driver for the 
nation and accounted for over 90 percent of total exports during the 1980s and 1990s. In 
1999, around 75 to 90 percent of state revenue was generated by oil.28 The countries plight 
was largely due to the twenty-seven year long civil war which plunged the country into 
chaos, killing an estimated 500,000 people,29 and leaving 3.5 million people, a third of her 
 
23 “The Angolan Civil War Part I: Oil,” Drillbits & Tailings, Global Policy Forum, (8th October 1999), Available at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/32877.html, (accessed 20th May 2010). 
24 Victoria Brittain, “Angola: what kind of a peace after decades of war?” Conflict, Security & Development, 2.2, 
(2002), p. 95. In 2008, Transparency International ranked Angola joint 158th out of 180 nations, with a score of 
1.9 (the lower the score from 1-10, the worse the perceived corruption.) “CPI Score 2008,” Transparency 
International UK,  Available at:  
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2008/2008_09_23_cpi_2008_en, 
(accessed 20th April 2010). 
25 World Bank Country Study, Angola, Oil, broad-based growth and equity, (Washington: D.C., 2007), p.8. 
26 Jad Mouawad, “Angola, one of the poorest places on Earth, is an oil industry darling,” The New York Times, 
(March 19th 2007), Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/business/worldbusiness/19iht-
angola.4961071.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1, (accessed 8th November 2009). 
27 Lena Weinstein, ‘The New Scramble for Africa,’ International Socialist Review, Third World Traveler, (July-
August 2008),  Available at: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Africa/New_Scramble_Africa.html, (accessed 
11th November 2009).   
28 Duncan Clarke, “Petroleum prospects and political power,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich eds., 
Angola’s war economy: the role of oil and diamonds, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p.196. 
29 Jad Mouawad, “Angola, one of the poorest places on Earth, is an oil industry darling.” 
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population fleeing their homes.30 It is important to stress that “[i]n the period since 
independence, oil has acquired  a quite exceptional significance in the political economy of 
Angola, affecting not only the nature of the economy, but also the course and eventual 
outcome of the war.”31 It is oils role in the prolongation of this conflict which will now be 
analysed.            
 Angola’s plight began with the hugely turbulent decade of the 1970s. This witnessed 
the end of the War of Independence (1961-1975) following a military coup in Portugal in 
April 1974, which forced the Angolan Portuguese colonial government to withdraw. In 
January 1975 the Alvor Agreements were signed by the three independent rebel groups 
who had all fought to overthrow the Portuguese; the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the 
Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA). The Alvor Accord had “provided for a 
joint interim government between the three groups and the creation of an integrated 
national army.”32 However, as the date for military integration neared, the agreement broke 
down with full scale war between the factions occurring from mid-1975 onwards. It was at 
this point that the MPLA seized control and backed up by Cuban forces and Soviet tanks, 
engaged the other factions whilst declaring the birth of the Peoples Republic of Angola in 
November 1975.33           
 Two inter connected factors help explain this costly breakdown. Firstly, although the 
three groups and their leaders had agreed to sign the Alvor Agreement as one political 
 
30 Ann Talbot, “The Angolan civil war and US foreign policy,” World Socialist Web Site, (13th April 2002), 
Available at: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/apr2002/ango-a13.shtml, (accessed 17th May 2010).  
31 Tony  Hodges,  Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, (Oxford: James Currey and Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2004 Second Edition), p.141. 
32 Alex Vines and Bereni Oruitemeka, “Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola,” Conflict, 
Security & Development, (June 2008), 8.2, p.242. 
33 R G Grant, Battle, A Visual Journey Through 5,000 Years of Combat, (London: Dorling Kindersley  Limited, 
2005),  p.339. 
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entity, post-independence brought to the surface the huge ideological and political 
differences that were apparent, chiefly between the two largest parties; the MPLA and 
UNITA.34 The MPLA had been a socialist party since the mid-1950s and this left leaning 
politick was not shared by UNITA. Secondly, these ideological differences became connected 
to the wider international Cold War that was occurring. The Cold War can be seen as the 
catalyst for the long-running civil war, which further divided the two major Angolan 
ideological parties and subsequently prevented any meaningful attempt at peace. The 
United States, “still stinging from its defeat in Vietnam... backed a two-pronged invasion by 
Holen Roberto’s Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) from the Congo/Zaire 
and from South Africa in support of Savimbi’s UNITA.”35 UNITA’s backing from the United 
States and South Africa was matched by Soviet Russian and Cuban support for the MPLA.36 
Both superpowers continued their ideological struggle in the lands of Angola which ravaged 
the nation and prevented any chance of reconciling either of the two political entities, who 
were able to battle out their own private war under their financial and military support. 
 However, the collapse of the Cold War fundamentally changed the nature of the 
conflict.  
Sensing the end of affairs, as they knew it, the Angolan warring parties began an 
early scramble for the possession and control of the resource-rich areas of Angola. 
They were determined to tap into the necessary resources as early as possible even 
if it meant buying their way into continuing conflict. This does not mean that there 
was no exploitation of resources before 1988. [Rather]...as of 1986 there was a 
deliberate concentration on procuring a foothold in these [resource rich] regions.37 
 
34 The MPLA had been a socialist led party since the mid-1950s. This political outlook was directly opposed to 
the populist policies of UNITA. 
35 Talbot, “The Angolan civil war and US foreign policy.” 
36 Holger Jensen, “Spoils of War,” Nando Times, Global Policy Forum, (15th March 2000), Available at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221/46994.html, (accessed 20th May 2010). 
37 Hannelie De Beer and Virgina Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?,” in 
Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich eds., Angola’s war economy: the role of oil and diamonds, (Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p.78. That is not to say that resource revenue was not used prior to the 
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This scramble for the possession of Angola’s natural resources would have disastrous results 
for the 1990s peace initiatives that had begun under the Bicesse Peace Accords of May 
1991. This Accord finally brought an end to the decades of conflict through a ceasefire and a 
“triple-zero” clause that prohibited acquisition of new weapons by either party or 
international actors from supplying such materials.  However, there were major issues. 
Firstly, no unity government was envisaged for the Bicesse post electoral period, which 
instead allowed a Winner Takes All electoral contest. This became fought along ethnic lines 
primarily due to the control over natural resources. The MPLA’s “protracted authoritarian 
governance [had] excluded particular regions of ethnic groups from power and the benefits 
of development” due to their locality in or away from the government oil regions.38 This 
further fuelled the deep seated hatred and hostility between the parties.39  What is more, 
the Bicesse Accords held no formal obligation for either of the factions to disarm or 
demobilise, which effectively allowed them to maintain and re-equip secret armies.40 This 
weak and fragile political Accord was further hampered by the natural resources which both 
sides exploited and used to fund their military wings. Indeed, an analysis of the 
government’s oil revenue highlights how oil helped to prolong this war during the 1990s.  
 “Direct Angolan state income from the oil sector was in the range of, US $1.8-3.0 
billion per year in the period 1990-1999.”41 This gave the MPLA substantial revenue from 
which to continue the armed struggle with figures for 1995 and 1996 from the International 
 
collapse of the Cold War. Traun in “China’s African Adventure,” notes that oil revenue allowed the regime of 
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos (1979-present) to buy weapons and mercenaries and engage the UNITA 
rebels in the cold war period. 
38 Robin Luckham, “The international community and state reconstruction in war-torn societies,” Conflict, 
Security & Development, (December 2004), 4.3, p.490. 
39 Vines and Oruitemeka, “Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola,” p.243. 
40 Vines and Oruitemeka, “Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola,” p.244. 
41 “A crude awakening, The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State 
Assets,” Global Witness, (21st January 1999), p.6, Available at: 
http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/93/en/a_crude_awakening, (accessed 24th May 
2010). 
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Institute of Strategic Studies revealing MPLA military expenditure of $400 million and $450 
million respectively.42  “Aircraft, vehicles and artillery from Brazil, helicopters, air-to-ground 
missiles and a variety of ammunition from France as well as AK-47s, Ural trucks, rocket-
propelled grenades, motors, ammunition, T-55 tanks and fighter aircraft from Russia.”43 The 
scale of these contracts was not small. The Russian press reported that a completed defence 
contract between the nations in 1998 was worth $1 billion.44  It was these military assets 
during the mid 1990s, brought through oil revenue that saw the MPLA government 
reluctant to seek a political settlement with UNITA. However, they were forced to sign the 
Lusaka Protocol’s and agree to a ceasefire in November 1994 due to the widespread 
devastation of the country which prevented the consolidation of their power brought 
through their military gains.45       
 Nevertheless, it must be stated that oil’s prolongation of the conflict was only one 
half of the story. The diamond revenue under UNITA also drew-out the war by substituting 
their loss of foreign military assistance which allowed the rebels to sustain their military 
campaign. Weakly enforced political agreements further aided UNITA in this matter. 
Although under the Bicesse Accords, “a United Nations Security Council embargo on arms 
and oil transfers to UNITA had been in place since 1993, the embargo was not enforced and 
[UNITA]...openly continued arms purchases.”46 De Beer and Gamba ascertain that UNITA 
controlled an estimated 70 percent of Angolan diamond production.47 It was at this height 
of their power in 1994 to 1997, that UNITA was estimated to be marketing on average, 
 
42 De Beer and Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?” p.87. 
43 De Beer and Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?” p.84.  
44 De Beer and Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?” p.87. 
45 Vines and Oruitemeka, “Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola,” p.245. 
46 Vines and Oruitemeka, “Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola,” p.245. 
47 De Beer and Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?” p.90. 
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about $600 million worth of diamonds annually.48 Taken as a whole, industrial experts put 
UNITA’s accumulative net revenue between 1992 and 1998 at $2 billion which was far more 
than the amounts ever received from the United States or South Africa.    
 The United Nations did eventually impose an international ban on the purchase of 
UNITA diamonds in July 1998 in an attempt to stem the flow of income for the group. 
However, this failed to stem the tide fully, with UNITA still achieving around $4 million 
carats worth in 2000.49 It was at this later stage of the decade that President dos Santos’s 
superior oil assets brought about the collapse of UNITA.  
On average during the period from 1997 to 2000, 14.4 percent of the country’s GDP 
was devoted to defence and security expenditure....[but] the figure is likely to be a 
substantial underestimate, since it does not include unrecorded or unclassified 
expenditures on defence and public order.50   
 
This GDP, made up primarily of oil money allowed the MPLA to capitalise on their 
technological superiority through the importation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from 
Israel, alongside brutal scorched earth tactics which eventually led to the death of UNITA’s 
leader, Jonas Savimbi in February 2002.51 Nonetheless, the end to the conflict was also due 
to the MPLA’s gradual reoccupation of the diamond mining regions which destroyed the 
natural resource military equilibrium that had existed throughout the 1990s.52 This eventual 
disproportion in resource revenue, coupled with the brutal tactics deployed by the MPLA, 
and the death of the UNITA leader brought about their eventual victory. At the beginning of 
 
48 Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p.174. 
49 UNITA were able to circumvent this embargo by selling “rough” diamonds i.e. uncut, directly for weapons. 
Indeed, these rough diamond caches constituted the primary and preferred means of stockpiling wealth for 
UNITA once there foreign assets had been frozen. (Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p180-181). 
50 Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p.160.  
51 Vines and Oruitemeka, “Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola,” p.249. 
52 Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p.204. 
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April 2002, the leaders of both parties signed an official ceasefire known as the Luena 
Memorandum of Understanding which has lasted to this day.53   
 Accordingly, oil and diamonds have played an important post Cold War role in the 
Angolan civil war. The 1990s witnessed multiple political agreements which were 
circumvented by both the MPLA and UNITA. It is important to note that peace deals in Africa 
between warring parties have been successful in the past. Mozambique’s internationally-
brokered General Peace Agreement signed in Rome, Italy, in 1992 between the ruling Front 
for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique Resistance Movement 
(RENAMO) is a case in point but “the fact that the incentives to continue fighting were less 
than in resource-rich countries such as Angola or the [Democratic Republic of Congo] DRC”54 
helped this peace deal to bear fruition over a far shorter and less costly time period than in 
Angola.55           
  This is a crucial point and highlights how oil and diamonds gave both parties’ the 
opportunity to pursue military options and therefore prolong the war and the misery for the 
Angolan people. Indeed, “[i]f [Angola’s resources of oil and diamonds] were managed 
properly, [her] economy would be among the most dynamic in the developing world. Its 
people would be among the best fed, best educated and healthiest on the African 
continent.”56  It is this contentious post war issue of rights to the oil revenue in Angola 
which can be also seen in Nigeria. Here, oil has created a clash between the local people on 
 
53 For a greater analysis of the peace process see: Aaron Griffiths, “The end of the war: the Luena 
Memorandum of Understanding,” conciliation resources, (2004), Available at: http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/angola/luena-memorandum.php, (accessed 19th May 2010).  
54 Luckham, “The international community and state reconstruction in war-torn societies,” p.493. 
55 See: Anicia Lala, “Donor conditionality and security-sector reform in Mozambique,” Conflict, Security & 
Development, (2003), 3.1, pp.145-150. 
56 Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State,  p.1. 
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the one hand and the national governments and multi-national oil corporations on the other 
over the rights to oil revenue. This second strand of oil’s effect on war will now be analysed.  
 
Nigeria 
“There is reasonable evidence that the presence of valuable natural assets increases the risk 
of rebellion.”57 
 
Nigeria is currently the United States fourth largest exporter of crude oil but is 
currently in the midst of an ever worsening militant situation situated in the Niger Delta, 
home to at least a quarter of Nigeria’s total petroleum output.58 “Historically, the people of 
the Niger Delta have always been at the mercy of greedy outsiders who plunder their 
natural resources without giving them anything in return, from the days of slavery to the 
present day.”59 The Delta and the wider nation have suffered through decades of national 
government corruption, bad governance, unemployment, insecurity, and a total 
indifference to poverty alleviation, which have all become key conflict triggers that underlie 
 
57 Paul Collier, Anthony J. Venables, “Managing the Exploitation of Natural Assets: lessons for low income 
countries,” p.22.  
58  Wale Adabanwi, “Nigeria: Shell of a State,” Dollars and Sense magazine, Third World Traveler, (July-August 
2001),  Available at: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Africa/Nigeria_Shell_State.html, (accessed 11th 
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much of the anger and resentment in the Delta.60 However, it is the national governments 
and the oil giant’s insensitivity to the local communities’ right to oil revenue which has 
caused the final escalation to low-intensity conflict.      
 Amnesty International in 2005 wrote that Delta “inhabitants remain among the most 
deprived oil communities in the world-70 percent live on less than $1 a day. [And that’s i]n 
spite of its windfall gains, as global prices have more than doubled in the last two years 
[2007 and 2008].”61  Living standards for the majority of Nigerians, not just those situated in 
the Delta, are no better than they were in the 1960s at the start of the oil boom.62 Not only 
do the inhabitants have to live in abject poverty but they also suffer “depreciation due to 
environmental degradation caused by oil spillage.”63 Royal Dutch Shell has had its 
operations in the Delta reported as outdated and in such poor condition that they would be 
illegal in other parts of the world.64 “Many communities report that they rarely receive any 
sufficient compensation for land taken by oil companies, or rendered useless by oil spills, 
acid rain, and other forms of pollution.”65       
 Indeed, the World Wildlife Fund considers that “it is one of the most polluted places 
on the face of the earth. Nigeria has the highest gas flaring rates in the world; until recently 
over 80 percent was flared as a result of drilling.”66 A majority burn for 24 hours a day with 
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some having remained active for 40 years. This has a direct impact on the local ecology, 
climate and people’s health and property.67 Furthermore, the United Nations has recorded 
over 6,800 spills between 1976 and 2001 whilst the Nigerian government has recorded over 
2,000 contaminated sites in the region.68      
 Thus, local people have justifiable 
[a]nger at the inequalities attributed to the oil economy [which] has led [to] 
increasing numbers of people from the communities in the oil region to protest [at] 
the exploitation of what they see as “their” oil-though the constitution provides that 
all oil is owned by the Federal Government-without benefit to them or 
compensation for the damage done to their lands and livelihoods.69  
    
The government response to this growing anger has been both brutal and violent, which has 
further fuelled the hostility within the Delta. For example, in the 1990s, the local Ogoni 
people of the Niger Delta were represented by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) in order to gain a greater national voice for their plight. However, between 
1993 and 1998, the military regime of the late General Sani Abacha deployed a military task 
force on Ogoni land to “keep the peace.” This led to the infamous hanging of MOSOP’s 
President, Saro-Wiwa along with eight other compatriots on trumped up charges in 
November 1995 in an attempt to violently suppress the growing Ogoni resentment at their 
mistreatment.70 This repressive governmental policy can be partly explained due to Nigeria’s 
mono-cultural economy. The Nigerian economy depends almost exclusively on crude oil 
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which makes it vulnerable to negative market forces, a condition known as the Dutch 
Disease.71 “When this happens, the state is unable to support itself and maintain domestic 
stability in the face of competing demands, hence the decision to resort to force.”72 
 However, it is the government’s failure to address the real grievance here i.e. failing 
to deliver fair access to oil profits and the ability of her people to build a better livelihood, 
not only for the local communities but also the wider population, which has brought about 
the growing conflict.73 This has gradually grown in strength. In January 1999, Isoko youths 
(an ethnic people who live in the Delta) shut down five of Shell’s flow-stations in the Delta 
state.74 These attacks have only grown in frequency, magnitude and coordination since the 
establishment of two highly militant groups; The Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF). MEND, since its 
establishment in 2006, has taken over 200 oil workers hostage and reduced Nigerian crude 
oil production to 1.5 million barrels a day (from its usual 2.1 million per day in 2008).75 The 
oil giants Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Agip have had to shore up over 300,000 barrels 
per day to prevent further losses and environmental damage in the Delta.76  The author 
John Ghazvinian stated that in the four or five days that he spent in the Delta, twenty-nine 
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foreign oil workers were taken hostage or kidnapped by the militants.77  These actions have 
badly damaged the Delta’s oil production. Mauowad noted that a quarter of the nation’s oil 
production, or about 600,000 barrels a day had been cut for nearly two years due to the 
violence in the Delta.78         
 Nonetheless, recent attempts at consultation by the government have appeared to 
have made progress.  A new Ministry of the Niger Delta has been established in order to 
reintegrate the people into wider society, the political power structure and mainstream 
policy making. President Umaru Yar’Adua has also granted a “general amnesty” to all rebel 
individuals in the hope that this dual strategy will finally bring an end to hostilities.  Recent 
Government reports suggest that “more than 8,000 militants have [already] disarmed and 
taken the amnesty offer since it began in August [2009].”79 The ceasefire has been extended 
to the end of October 2009, so it remains uncertain whether these initiatives have nullified 
the violence in the region on a longer basis.80 What does remain clear is that  “[u]nless the 
government and the oil companies change their basic attitude towards the local people in 
the Niger Delta, conflict and litigation are there to stay.”81      
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 This clash between the state and the local people can also be seen within Sudan, 
where the oil fields of the south have been coveted by both Khartoum and her southern 
region. Oil’s role here is exceedingly complex, but this next part will chart oil’s chief 
ramifications on this war torn nation. 
 
Sudan 
“Save for a period of roughly a decade, Sudan has endured an intense civil war in its south 
since its independence [from the British] in 1956.”82 
 
Sudan is Africa’s largest nation with an estimated population of 36 million people. 
These are split into 450 diverse ethnic groups which have created a myriad of social, 
religious and cultural identities.83 A key period of the nation’s history followed the Battle of 
Omdurman in September 1898, which established the Anglo-Egyptian condominium and in 
effect, made Sudan a British Imperial possession.84 Britain “sought to modernise Sudan by 
applying European technology to its underdeveloped economy and by replacing its 
authoritarian institutions with ones that adhered to liberal English traditions.”85 However, 
the south’s poorly developed regions received little attention until after World War One, 
with the British justification being that the south was “not ready for the exposure to the 
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modern world”86 and therefore closed to all foreign outsiders, including northern Sudanese. 
This British “Southern Policy” as it was known from the 1920s, helped to reinforce separatist 
development policy and the idea of a distinct southern region of Sudan. In reality, this saw 
the promotion of Christianity rather than Islam and English rather than Arabic which was 
justified as protecting southern traditions and culture.87 It is this policy which would have 
giant ramifications that have lasted to the present day.    
 This situation continued until Britain and Egypt concluded an agreement providing 
for Sudanese self-government and self-determination in February 1953. This heralded a 
transitional period in Sudanese politics, with the inauguration of her first parliament in 1954 
and full Sudanese independence in January 1956.88 However, the north reneged in on 
promises to create a feudal political system leading towards Southern independence, which 
left Southern people disenfranchised and angry.89 Furthermore, “successive northern 
governments, civilian and military, were unsuccessful in handling the growing southern 
problems, ranging from neglect to attempts to reverse British isolation through enforced 
“‘Arabisation’ and ‘Islamisation.’”90 The political inequality coupled with cruel religious and 
cultural conversions helped to cause the First Sudanese civil-war, a low-intensity conflict 
fought between southern separatists and Khartoum military forces that would last 
seventeen years from 1955 to 1972. It was only through the mediation of Ethiopia’s 
Emperor Haile Selassie that a peace agreement was drawn up; the Addiss Ababa Agreement 
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in March 1972.91           
 A key factor which gave rise to the resumption of hostilities was former President 
Nimeria’s (1969-1985) introduction of Sharia (Islamist) Law in September 1983. This was 
viewed with particular alarm and hostility in the south and coupled with the continuing 
perception of Khartoum malevolence towards the region, led to the resumption of 
hostilities and Sudan’s second civil war in 1983. This long running and brutal “conflict has 
exacerbated the already grinding poverty of local communities by destroying their fragile 
economic base, property and social fabric, as well as inflicting endless misery on several 
generations.”92 The war has been terribly costly in human lives with approximately two 
million people thought to have been killed and a further 4.4 million people displaced.93  It is 
this second civil war, fought between the Khartoum government and the southern Sudan’s 
People Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing, the Sudan’s Peoples Liberation 
Movement (SPLM), collectively known as SPLA/M, which reveals two interlinked impacts 
that oil has had on this war.         
 Oil’s first impact on this war reveals a similar if not exact situation to the Angolan 
civil war of the 1990s. For the government, the conflict provided an excellent opportunity to 
renew its strategy to displace the indigenous non-Arab rural population from rural areas of 
the oil region in order to secure and clear territory for oil development and assure a steady 
flow of revenue.94 It did so through a smokescreen policy of “defending” the southern oil 
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fields and their Chinese and Western investors via depopulation through force. In reality, 
brutal tactics were employed which included the “abduction of women and children, gang 
rapes, ground assaults supported by helicopter gunships, destruction of humanitarian relief 
sites, and burning of villages.”95 The United States has in the past accused the Sudanese 
government of bombing villages whilst “U.N. relief workers were trying to distribute food to 
tens of thousands of hungry villages.”96         
 It took almost two decades (from the 1970s onwards) and various governments to 
develop this strategy, but by the early 2000s, Khartoum had wrested control of the oilfields 
away from the south.97 Moreover, the income generated “enabled the government to 
rapidly improve its heavy weaponry, expand its air superiority and purchase attack 
helicopters”98 which were used against the SPLA rebels and local populace.99 Statements 
from officials within the government provide evidence of this “oil for weapons” exchange. 
The president... announced in 2000 that Sudan was using the oil revenue to build a 
domestic arms industry. The military spending of 90.2 billion dinars (U.S. $349 
million) for 2001 was to soak up more than 60 percent of the 2001 oil revenue of 
149.7 billion dinars (U.S. $580.2 million).100  
 
 
95 “Sudan’s Oilfields Burn Again: Brinkmanship Endangers The Peace Process,” International Crisis Group (IGC), 
Global Policy Forum, (10th February 2003), Available at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0210burn.pdf, (accessed 24th May 2010).  
96 “Sudan Civil War Becoming War Over Oil- UN Report,” Reuters, Global Policy Forum, (10th October 2001), 
Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/40302.html, (accessed 24th May 
2010). 
97 “Sudan- Whose Oil?, Sudan’s Oil Industry, Facts and Analysis” Fatal Attractions, (April 2008), p. 6, Available 
at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/042008sudanoil.pdf, (accessed 21st May 2010).  
98 International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country, Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, p.117. See also, World 
Tribune, “Sudan builds new weapons factories with Chinese help,” Available at: 
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2001/af_sudan_06_15.html, (accessed 19th April 2010). 
99 China has provided military assistance in the past. Ali Askouri, “China’s investment in Sudan: displacing 
villages and destroying communities,” in Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, eds., African perspectives on China 
in Africa,  (Cape Town, Nairobi, Oxford; Fahamu-Networks for Social Justice, 2007), noted that ‘China sold 
Sudan SCUD missiles in 1996 in a deal underwritten by a Malaysian government loan against future oil 
extraction.’ p.75-76. 
100 “Sudan, Oil and Human Rights,” Human Rights Watch, (2003), Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/sudanprint.pdf, (accessed 9th November 2009),  p.59.  
23 
 
“The war effort [alone] cost over U.S $1 million per day in 2001, a staggering figure for a 
country where 3.1 million people need emergency food aid according to international 
agencies.”101             
 The second key impact of oil has been its role in re-initialising hostilities. Although 
the chief reasons that brought about the second Sudanese war have been political and 
social divisions, “the slightly waxy, light-grade petroleum was merely one more token of the 
schism between Sudan’s ruling north and neglected south.”102 Oil had first been discovered 
in the 1970s within the Muglad and Melut rift basins. These were “situated on the very front 
line of Africa’s longest-running civil war”103  and became contested areas of strategic control 
between the warring factions which witnessed innumerable human rights violations against 
the civilian population.104 Indeed, the prize of “black gold” from these fields is not in-
substantial. “According to [the] Oil and Gas Journal (OGC), Sudan had five billion barrels of 
proved oil reserve in January 2009 up from an estimated 563 million barrels in 2006.”105 It is 
this lucrative oil revenue that International Crisis Group suggests was a prime reason for 
Khartoum’s resistance to southern independence.106 Additionally, “oil is considered the 
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single leading factor in the perception of [the] Sudanese civil war.”107  The ownership of 
these oil reserves were controlled by Khartoum and it has been the Sudanese regime’s 
refusal to give the south a say in the development of the fields that “was one of the original 
causes of Sudan’s 16 year civil war.”108      
 However, two intertwined concessions brought about a breakthrough in the peace 
talks.109 The first key breakthrough was that “unlike previous peace agreements in the 
Sudan it was signed only after war-weary protagonists were convinced that military victory 
was not achievable.”110 Secondly, oil itself helped to provide a key end to the war, as the 
conflict had severely hampered Sudan’s ability to export oil.111 Thus, Khartoum took the 
brave step of granting the South rights to a vote of self-determination (after an interim six 
year period),112 and crucially, the ability to take the southern oil fields with them.113 As a 
proviso, Khartoum allocated the oil profits as a 50-50 split for the interim period, which was 
in essence a “key economic guarantee for effective implementation of the CPA.”114 As Salah 
Wahbi (President of the Sudanese Advanced Petroleum Company) commented, both sides 
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‘“will see that it’s better to share in the oil than to leave it for someone else.”’115 
 Nevertheless, the future does not look bright.  Although the CPA specified how the 
oil revenue should be split, the  
problem is that the southern government cannot verify that the oil figures published 
by the Khartoum government are correct. All of the southerners that Global Witness’ 
investigators spoke to suspected that the figures were incorrect. Even the World 
Bank states that transparency in the Sudanese oil sector ‘is unusually weak.’116   
 
The Khartoum government has reported that a smaller volume of oil was produced in the oil 
fields than that reported by the company that operates them; a full 14 percent lower in 
blocks 3 and 7 in 2007 and 26 percent in blocks 1, 2, 4 and 6 in 2005.117 “The difference in 
question- 12 million barrels of oil-is significant. The oil is worth $370 million2 and is enough 
to power a city in the US the size of San Francisco for a year.”118 Longer-term issues 
concerning oil, such as fair access to the petroleum and the distribution of state resources 
across rich and poor areas of Sudan have also not been addressed.119 The situation has been 
further hampered by the ownership oil-rich Abyei region, which was left unresolved under 
the CPA agreement.  President al-Bashir has stated that he will not budge an inch and has 
rejected an independent commissions report on demarcation which would seriously affect 
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both sides revenue distribution of oil.120 This has left the contested regions firmly in the 
hands of the Khartoum government, which can only breed further grievance.121  
 This oil discrepancy is further fuelling the decade’s long mistrust between the 
regions and could well bring about the collapse of the CPA. “A return to conflict looks all too 
likely. Armies are already massing on either side of the border.”122 A war which has already 
affected the lives of millions of people could once again be resumed due to the long-running 
dispute over ownership and revenue from oil in Sudan.     
 
Conclusion: Oil’s many murky roles 
“The vested interests associated with access to the oil rent flowing to the state remain a 
powerful obstacle to reform,”123 
 
Thus, as these three case studies illustrate, oil has played a varied role in war and 
conflict on the African continent. Its role and impact depend very much on the context of 
the country it is in. Although there has been conflict in all three of the nations highlighted 
above, each has been affected by its oil resource in similar and different ways. Yet 
petroleum’s decisive impact on war has been further heightened by two interconnected 
trends which appear in all three African oil producing countries.     
 
120 Edward, “Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” p.17.  
121 Ibrahim Hamdi, “Sudan’s President Refuses to Budge Over Oil Region,” Reuters, Global Policy Forum, (18th 
November 2007), Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/40257.html, 
(accessed 24th May 2010). Oil revenue makes up over half of the revenue for Northern Sudan and over 95 
percent of Southern Sudan’s. Edward, “Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement,” p.19. 
122 “Fuelling Mistrust, The need for Transparency in Sudan’s Oil Industry,” p.5. 
123 Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State,  p.206. 
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 Firstly greed, not only from within government but also from individuals connected 
to the state who wish to harness black gold for their own profits, will cause them to turn 
their backs on the needs of wider society, which could benefit from this oil revenue and 
achieve an enhanced quality of life through public investment.124 For example, in Angola, a 
miserly 13.3 percent of the state budget was estimated to have been spent on education, 
health, social security and housing in 1997 from an oil industry that amasses billions every 
year.125 In the late 1990s, the Angolan government awarded ultra-deep water oil blocks to 
the French Elf petroleum company whilst the Presidency pocketed a reputed $400 to $500 
million that had bypassed the state budget.126 Global Witness has figures from 2000 which 
highlight some $770 million that has “gone missing” between the Ministry of Petroleum and 
the Ministry of Finance. By 2001, this financial black hole may have increased to an 
estimated $1.4 billion by 2001.127 These facts highlight the disillusionment from 
international NGO’s who see no real attempt at confronting Angola’s huge post-war societal 
problems.128  It is not just located within Angola. In Southern Sudan, an estimated 45 
percent of the state revenue in 2008 was budgeted for salaries which have led to 
increasingly widespread allegations of corruption.129    
 Secondly, connected to this first point is that bad governance and accountability 
mechanisms allows political administrations and multinational oil corporations the ability to 
 
124 See: Paul Collier, Anthony J. Venables, “Managing resource revenue: lessons for low income countries,” 
(revised 20th October 2008), p. 1-2, Available at: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/africa.htm, 
(accessed 26th May 2010).  
125 “A crude awakening, The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of 
State Assets,” Global Witness, p.8. 
126 “A crude awakening, The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of 
State Assets,” Global Witness, p.10-11. 
127 “All the Presidents’ Men, The devastating story of oil and banking in Angola’s privatised war.” Global 
Witness, (March 2002), Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0302presidents.pdf, (accessed 
19th May 2010), p.48. 
128 Brittain, “Angola: what kind of a peace after decades of war?,” p.96. 
129 Edward, “Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” p.27. 
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avoid political scrutiny on oil expenditure which will lead to growing levels of societal 
discontent.130 When oil was first found in Nigeria in the 1950s, she was on the cusp of 
gaining independence from Britain, and this oil revenue was seen as the launching pad for 
the economy, the young nation and her people to prosper. Instead, it has become a perfect 
launchpad for corrupt politicians and businessman to enrich themselves at the expense of 
their people.131 In Southern Sudan, official government expenditure on defence was 30 per 
cent though unofficial estimates are much higher.132 Oil, whose revenue can be utilised to 
better the majority of citizens in these three countries, has only led to suffering, strife, ruin 
and war and it is the innocent who have and will continue to suffer the most.  
 When drawing together the investigation into the three case studies, a number of 
repercussions that oil have had on war become apparent. Within Angola, the three 
independence factions fought for a free post colonial nation. The Cold War threw the 
political and ideological differences between them into an unfathomable chasm which were 
played out in a horrific three decade long civil war. Therefore, it was not until the collapse of 
the Cold War and the removal of the superpowers financial and material support, that oil 
and diamond revenue became crucial. During the 1990s, it was these resources which were 
converted into ready cash to fund military campaigns. These military options were also 
made possible by the weak peace agreements, which lacked credible or viable methods of 
 
130 See: Paul Collier, Frderick van der Ploeg and Anthony J. Venables, “Managing Resources in Developing 
Economies,” (28th January 2009), p.3, Available at: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/africa.htm, 
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control. It is difficult to know if these Peace agreements would have been adhered to and 
sustained in the 1990s without Angola’s large natural resource wealth. Certainly 
Mozambique’s peace agreement reveals that successful political solutions are possible 
between embittered enemies. Nevertheless, what can be stated justifiably is that the 
Angolan civil war was prolonged during the 1990s through both oil and diamonds at the cost 
of peace.           
 The role of oil in Nigeria and the low-intensity conflict here is different to Angola. It 
has been shaped by successive governments and international oil companies who have 
ridden roughshod over local people’s rights for many decades.  These local people deserved 
a share in Nigeria’s oil wealth and the ability to improve their livelihoods and standard of 
living but have been constantly denied any right to oil wealth and revenue even though oil is 
being extracted from their land. During the early and mid 1990s, the government responded 
brutally to perceived “rebels” that threatened Nigeria’s oil supply, but this tactic only 
increased the deep rooted animosity and injustices felt within the Niger Delta. It was due to 
the government’s disregard of the fundamental injustices felt by these people that caused 
this widespread militant campaign, with current government initiatives attempting to 
provide a greater political voice and legal impunity for the rebel actions. These initiatives, 
although a positive step are not enough. Oil in Nigeria, a hugely valuable commodity for any 
nation to possess and which promised so many economic and social benefits, not only for 
the people of the Niger Delta, but also for the wider country, has caused an explosion of 
violence that need not have occurred. Her government and civilian elite have only grown 
richer on the backs of the local Delta communities and it is this greed for oil revenue which 
has fuelled the flames of conflict.         
 In Sudan, a dual impact of oil is seen on this war. For Khartoum, the discovery of oil 
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reinvigorated governmental policy to “tame” southern Sudan in order to control this 
valuable pool of revenue. It also removed, at least to begin with, any attempts at gaining a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict, as Khartoum now wished to suppress Southern Sudan 
once and for all and gain complete domination of the resources. It did eventually achieve 
this objective, which gave them the ability to acquire greater and more sophisticated levels 
of weaponry and continue to wage the war against the SPLM/A. Once, again, this was 
achieved at the cost of the development of the nation, or any meaningful attempt at 
tackling the humanitarian catastrophe within Darfur.     
 The second impact of oil is linked to the first, and indeed to oil’s role in 1990s 
Angola. In Sudan, the war here was not originally about oil fields, but instead a war of 
southern self-determination that had been fuelled by the British policy of an “alternative” 
southern Sudan. The discovery of oil gave those fighting the war yet another reason to 
continue the struggle and gain both political and resource independence. Peace has only 
born fruition when the issue of who controlled the oilfields was taken, albeit, within a 
delayed interim period. However, greed has reared its ugly head, and it is now no longer 
clear if Khartoum is willing to be transparent with the south over oil extraction totals. This 
will be highly damaging to the fragile peace that has existed and could well cause a re- 
initialisation of war with the innocent the main casualties.     
 Overall, oil has had and will continue to have, a decidedly murky role not only on 
these three wars, but any future wars on the African continent which contain this resource. 
Oil can fund military campaigns, prolong war, shatter peace initiatives and cause untold 
suffering and misery on civilian populations. Its potential positive effect on national 
development has been lost in a myriad of greed, corruption and poor governance whilst its 
effect on war is all too clear. 
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